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PATENTS-ADJUDICATION OF VALIDITY IN INFRINGEl\IENT CASES WHERE
ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL EXIST-Petitioner's complaint alleging validity and infringement of his patent was dismissed by the trial court
on the ground that petitioner had granted to respondent an implied license
or "shop right." On appeal, petitioner claimed, among other things, error
in the refusal of the trial court to rule on the questions of validity and
infringement of the patent. Respondent moved to strike these claims
from petitioner's statement of points on appeal. Held, motion denied.
Failure of the trial court to pass on the questions of validity and infringement does not preclude the petitioner from arguing these issues on
appeal. Kierulff v . .Metropolitan Stevedore Co., 300 F.2d 614 (9th Cir.
1962).
The motion in the principal case raises the question of whether a trial
court, in a patent infringement suit, should be required to rule on the
validity of a patent when adequate grounds, other than invalidity, exist
for dismissal of the suit (e.g., non-infringement, shop right, implied license).
Initially, the judiciary adopted the "esprit de patentability" approach
toward infringement suits, avoiding the question of validity of a patent
when alternative grounds for dismissal could be found.1 The courts
felt that an inquiry into the validity of a patent would be superfluous to
disposal of the case, serving only as an unjustified advisory opinion.2 As a
result, dismissal of an infringement suit judicially reinforced "the presumption of validity arising from the fact of the grant." 3 Judge Jerome Frank,
in a concurring opinion, first attacked the "esprit de patentability"
approach, stating that the courts had a duty to protect the "paramount
public interest" by invalidating defective patents which are brought to
light in infringement suits.4 This particular view came near to attaining
Supreme Court approval in Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 5
where Mr. Justice Jackson stated: "It has come to be recognized ... that
of the two questions [validity and infringement], validity has the greater
... importance ... and the District Court in this case followed what will
usually be the better practice by inquiring fully into the validity of this
patent." 6 This "better practice" standard has been interpreted by a small
g1·oup of jurists as a peremptory directive to the trial courts to examine
1 See Armstrong Cork Co. v. United Cork Cos., 107 F.2d 36, 39-40 (3d Cir. 1939);
\\'oodward, A Reconsideration of the Patent System as a Problem of Administrative
Law, 55 HARV. L. REv. 950, 957 (19-12).
2 See, e.g., Franklin v. Masonite Corp., 132 F.2d 800, 801 (2d Cir. 1942); National
Nut Co. v. Sontag Chain Stores Co., 107 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1939), rev'd on other
grounds, 310 U.S. 281 (1940); Krasnow v. Sacks &: Perry, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 828, 829
(.S.D.N.Y. 1945); S. R. Leon, Inc. v. Parfums Schiaparelli, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 641 (S.D.N.Y.
1940).
8 Infa v. Buick Motor Co., 88 F.2d 947, 951 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 702
(1937); accord, Penmac Corp. v. Esterbrook Steel Pen Mfg. Co., 108 F.2d 695, 697 (2d
Cir. 1940). Under 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1958), "a patent shall be presumed valid."
4 Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B.G. Corp., 130 F.2d 290, 293 (2d Cir. 1942).
5 325 U .s. 327 (1945).
G Id. at 330. (Emphasis added.)
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the validity of a patent before proceeding to the question of infringement.7
At the other extreme, several lower court decisions have failed to give any
recognition to the "better practice" standard, evidently viewing it as an
insignificant dictum, and have in essence followed the "esprit de patentability" approach of the pre-Sinclair period.8 An intermediate position
has also evolved, interpreting the "better practice" language as a grant
of procedural discretion to courts deciding infringement suits.0 According
to this last view, the "better practice" is a permissive rather than a mandatory standard, 10 serving as a word of caution to the trial courts to examine
the validity of the patent if it is convenient under the circumstances
of the case.11
The reasons for the diverse interpretations of the "better practice"
standard can best be understood through an examination of the policies
underlying each view. The peremptory-directive decisions emphasize that
this procedure results first in a better protection of the paramount public
interest in the patent system, and second, in a conservation of judicial
energy and expense. The argument based on public interest in the patent
system implies that invalid grants of patents are not uncommon, 12 and that
since the government is limited in its ability to contest these grants, 13 the
judiciary should do so. Through judicial action, "scarecrows" and more
subtle forms of invalid patents would be removed. This would encourage
not only inventions, but increased manufacturing activity and trade on
the part of individuals and companies previously dissuaded by an illusion
that the patentee had a valid monopoly. The conservation of judicial
energy argument for a mandatory examination of the validity question
stresses the removal of costly repetition from the judicial process. A patent
must be found to be valid before a judgment of infringement can be
7 See, e.g., Helbush v. Finkle, 170 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1948); Measurements Corp. v.
F'erris Instrument Corp., 159 F.2d 590, 592 (3d Cir. 1947); Pennington Eng'r Co. v.
Spicer Mfg. Corp., 165 F.2d 59, 61 (6th Cir. 1947); Sunlite Mfg. Co. v. Clarvan Corp.,
73 F. Supp. 938, 941 (E.D. Wis. 1947).
8 See, e.g., Crowson v. Dennington, 141 F. Supp. 647, 650 (W.D. Ark. 1956); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 91 F. Supp. 218, 223 (D. Md.), afj'd, 185 F.2d 672
(4th Cir. 1950); Radio Patents Corp. v. United States, 145 Ct. Cl. 753, 169 F. Supp. 489
(1959); Trusty v. United States, 132 Ct. Cl. 192, 132 F. Supp. 340 (1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 975 (1956).
o See, e.g., Spartan Corp. v. Evans Prods. Co., 293 F.2d 699, 705 (6th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 967 (1962); Dow Chem. Co. v. Skinner, 197 F.2d 807, 812 (6th Cir. 1952);
Flakice Corp. v. Liquid Freeze Corp., 131 F. Supp. 599, 601 (N.D. Cal. 1955); A. L. Wallau,
Inc. v. J. W. Landenberger 8: Co., 121 F. Supp. 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
10 See Philadelphia Gear Works, Inc. v. Kerotest Mfg. Co., 101 F. Supp. 820, 821
(W.D. Pa. 1951); Cincinnati Milling Mach. Co. v. Turchan, 101 F. Supp. 621, 623 (E.D.
Mich. 1951), afj'd, 208 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1953); Kennametal, Inc. v. American Cutting
Alloys, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 136, 144 (D. Del. 1948).
11 See Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162-63 (2d Cir. 1950); Estate Stove
Co. v. General Motors Corp., 79 F. Supp. 765, 767 (S.D. Ohio 1948).
12 See Kenyon, Patent Law: Why Challenge the Courts' View of "Invention"!, 35
A.B.A.J. 480,482 (1949); Woodward, supra note 1, at 957.
13 See United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224 (1897).
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granted.14 Thus a finding of validity at the trial stage would spare an
appellate court wishing to reverse a finding of non-infringement the
time and expense of remanding for determination of the validity issue.15
Furthermore, initial adjudication of the validity issue would remove the
need for defendants, dismissed of infringement charges, to ask for declaratory judgments for the purpose of refuting the judicially-reinforced presumption of patentability that exists to their disfavor. 16
Supporters of the "esprit de patentability" approach counter the above
policy arguments by emphasizing the subtleties behind the procedure in
a patent suit. A non-infringing defendant may often be satisfied with
dismissal of the suit on grounds of non-infringement and will therefore
concentrate his efforts on that issue, making only minimal preparation for
argument as to invalidity of the patent. 17 Thus certain patentees would
be encouraged to bring infringement suits, regardless of their chances
on the infringement question, in hope of having their dubious patents
legally affirmed.1 8 Findings of validity, based on the strength of the
patentee's evidence and subject only to token refutation by the noninfringing defendant, would probably be rendered. These findings could
be wielded by the patentee against prospective infringers, 19 and as a
result, technological progress might well be stifled. Moreover, if a court had
to examine the validity issue, judicial energy would be needlessly exhausted.
At the trial level, rulings of validity would amount to superfluous advisory
opinions on hypothetical cases since alternative grounds of non-infringement
could adequately dispose of the case. Also, the appellate courts would gain
little, if any, benefit from the examination of the validity issue. Appellate
courts seldom reverse non-infringement judgments and, when they do, a remand is necessary only in cases involving conflicting oral testimony. 20 Since
14 E.g., Hycon Mfg. Co. v. H. Koch &: Sons, 219 F.2d 353, 356 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 953 (1955); Patterson v. Rota-Hangar Co., 85 F. Supp. 1019, 1020-21 (S.D. Cal.
1949).
15 See Helbush v. Finkle, 170 F.2d 41, 42 (9th Cir. 1948); Barry v. General Tire &:
Rubber Co., 31 F. Supp. 879, 880 (N.D. Ill. 1940), affd, 122 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1941).
10 Sec Spartan Corp. v. Evans Prods. Co., 293 F.2d 699, 705 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 967 (1962).
17 A defendant who can easily prove non-infringement will hesitate to go to the
trouble and expense of attacking the validity of a patent. This is especially true of a defendant with limited funds, since the cost of trying a patent's validity may be as much as
SI00,000. See Wabash Corp. v. Ross Elec. Corp., 187 F.2d 577, 590 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J.,
concurring and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 820 (1951); Woodward, supra note
1, at 953.
18 See Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1942).
10 Since a finding of validity is superfluous to a decision of non-infringement, it would
not become res judicata to the detriment of either the dismissed defendant or persons
unconnected with the suit. However, such a finding would undoubtedly discourage both
parties from bringing subsequent suits to contest the validity of the patent. See "Wabash
Corp. v. Ross Elec. Corp., 187 F.2d 577, 589 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 820 (1951);
Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B.G. Corp., 130 F.2d 290, 293 (2d Cir. 1942); Scott, Collateral
Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1, 12-13 (1942).
20 See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394-96 (1948); Dollar
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patent evidence consists largely of physical exhibits, documentary evidence
is often decisive of the issues.21 Thus findings of validity do not invariably
aid the appellate courts.
Proponents of the discretionary approach find theoretical support in
the language of Sinclair. 22 As one court has observed, "The Supreme Court
employed the significant word 'usually,' thus indicating that a ruling upon
validity is not essential in all cases involving both infringement and validity."23 Practically, the discretionary• view avoids a procedural strait jacket by
examining validity when it is convenient under the circumstances.24 This
approach enables the courts to fluctuate between the competing policies of
the extremists' views in deciding whether to determine the validity of a
patent in a given case.
Pragmatically, it has been easier to adopt the peremptory directive
view of the "better practice" in the cases requiring a detailed analysis
into the infringement issue. 25 The court, by first examining the validity
of a patent, simultaneously gathers information as to its infringement.26
However, in cases of clear non-infringement the courts have favored the
"esprit de patentability" approach, since the task of investigating the
validity issue is more inconvenient under those circumstances. Courts
following the discretionary view have been able to apply it with comparative ease to either factual situation by exercising discretion; they have
favored examination of validity in difficult cases of infringement but have
v. Land, 184 F.2d 245, 248-49 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 539-40 (2d
Cir. 1950).

21 See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., supra note 20, at 395; Smith
v. Hall, 301 U.S. 216, 228 (1937). In both cases the documentary evidence offered proved
decisive of the validity question.
22 325 U.S. 327, 330 (1945); see Sparton Corp. v. Evans Prods. Co., 293 F.2d 699, 705
(6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 967 (1962).
23 Dow Chem. Co. v. Skinner, 197 F.2d 807, 812 (6th Cir. 1952).
24 Factors influencing the court to examine the validity of a patent are: apparent
invalidity (scarecrows), intensity of public interest in the patent, and the interjection of
the validity question by the complaint, e.g., an alleged infringer asking for a declaratory
judgment on the validity of the patent. If non-infringement is clear or validity conceded
by the defendant, however, jurisdictions following the discretionary interpretation usually
refuse to examine validity. Compare Hall v. Wright, 125 F. Supp. 269, 274 (S.D. Cal. 1954),
afj'd, 240 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1957), and Van Der Horst Corp. of America v. Chromium
Corp. of America, 98 F. Supp. 412, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), afj'd, 197 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1952),
and Eaton Mfg. Co. v. Sibley, 60 F. Supp. 801, 805 (E.D. Mich. 1945), with Specialty Equip.
&: Mach. Corp. v. Zell Motor Car Co., 193 F.2d 515, 520 (4th Cir. 1952), and Kennametal,
Inc. v. American Cutting Alloys, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 136, 144 (D. Del. 1948).
25 For purposes of this discussion, the factual situations of infringement suits may
be categorized as those in which the issue of infringement is questionable, and those in
which non-infringement is clear. Compare Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. v. Brewster Finish•
ing Co., 113 F. Supp. 714 (D.N.J. 1953), aff'd, 210 F.2d 677 (3d Cir. 1954), with Kennametal,
Inc. v. American Cutting Alloys, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 136 (D. Del. 1948).
26 Sec Specialty Equip.&: Mach. Corp. v. Zell Motor Car Co., 193 F.2d 515, 519-20 (4th
Cir. 1952).
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found such a procedure inconvenient in situations of clear non-infringement.27
The spectrum of approaches to the validity issue intensifies the need
for unifying infringement procedure. Any future attempt to accomplish
this should be based on the principle emerging from the cases examined:
a patentee must not be allowed to enjoy the benefits of an invalid patent
to the detriment of potential innovators and the general public. Because of
their apparent defects, the prevailing procedural approaches fall short
of this goal. Peremptory direction may lead to judicial pronouncements
of validity based on the evidence of a patentee; "esprit de patentability"
often allows invalid patents to stand; and the discretionary view may fall
prey to the weaknesses inherent in either of the existing alternatives. This
reinforces the soundness of Judge Frank's view that in cases of noninfringement the court should always examine whether a patent is
invalid but should never pronounce a patent valid.28 This procedure
would have the advantages of ferreting out invalid patents while leaving
the others clothed, at worst, in a presumption rather than a judicial
finding of validity. Adoption of this procedure should discourage litigation
of dubious patents and eliminate superfluous findings of validity.

Walter A. Urick

21 Compare A. L. Wallau, Inc. v. J. W. Landenberger &: Co., 121 F. Supp. 555, 559
(S.D.N.Y. 1954), with Cincinnati Milling Mach. Co. v. Turchan, 101 F. Supp. 621, 623
(E.D. Mich. 1951), afj'd, 208 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1953).
28 See Wabash Corp. v. Ross Elec. Corp., 187 F.2d 577, 591 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 820 (1951).

